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ZAL v. STEPPE: NINTH CIRCUIT 
APPROVAL OF AN IN LIMINE BAN OF 
SPECIFIC WORDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Zal v. Steppe,l the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that, in an abortion clinic criminal tres-
pass case, a defense attorney who violated an in limine ban of 
specific words related to abortion could be held in contempt 
without violating the First Amendment.2 Thus, the court deter-
mined that the in limine ban of 50 specific words and phrasess 
was constitutionally sound.4 Additionally, the court determined 
that the in limine ban did not violate the defendants' Sixthli and 
Fourteenth AmendmentS rights to counsel, trial by jury, and due 
process of law.7 
The rationale for the Ninth Circuit's holding was two-fold. 
To establish the extent of an attorney's First Amendment rights 
in the courtroom, the court cited dicta from the United States 
Supreme Court case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada8 stating 
1. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Farris, J.; Trott, J., concurring; 
and Noonan, J., concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 121 L. 
Ed. 2d 582 (1992). 
2. [d. at 929. See infra note 33 for full text of the first amendment. 
3. See infra note 64 for a definition of in limine. See infra note 21 for words and 
phrases excluded. Additionally, the trial court banned the use of the defenses of neces-
sity, defense ,of others, mistake of fact, and compliance with international laws, treaties 
or declarations. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925. 
4. [d. at 928. 
5. See infra note 34 for full text of the sixth amendment. 
6. See infra note 35 for full text of the fourteenth amendment. 
7. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929-30. 
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that whatever free speech rights an attorney has in the court-
room are extremely circumscribed.9 To support its conclusion 
that attorneys could not disobey court orders, the court relied on 
Sacher v. United States lO which explained that the only right an 
attorney has when faced with an adverse ruling is to respectfully 
preserve the point for appeal. ll The Ninth Circuit thus held that 
an attorney cannot use the First Amendment as a "shield" to 
disobey a court order.12 
Zal set an important precedent. It is the first reported case 
in any jurisdiction where an in limine ban of more than one 
word or phrase has been granted.13 Because the Ninth Circuit 
determined that attorneys' rights in the courtroom are circum-
scribed, the court was able to avoid performing a thorough con-
stitutional analysis of the ban. I4 Consequently, the court con-
doned the use of word-bans without providing any guidelines to 
assist lower court judges in determining whether to grant 
them, 111 and effectively sanctioned unlimited judicial discretion 
to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.16 
II. FACTS 
Attorney Cyrus Zal, former general counsel for the anti-
abortion group Operation Rescue,I7 represented seven anti-abor-
tion activists who were charged with criminal trespass. I8 The ac-
9. Zal. 968 F.2d at 928. 
10. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See infra note 168 for a discussion of Sacher. 
11. Zal. 968 F.2d at 928. 
12. Id. at 929. 
13. See infra notes 85-101 and acc,ompanying text for a discussion of in limine bans 
of words and phrases. 
14. See Zal. 968 F.2d at 927-29. 
15. See infra notes 295-304 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 306-19 and accompanying text. 
17. Associated Press. Ruling Against Lawyer Upheld. LA TIMES, July 2. 1992 at 
B8. 
18. Criminal Trespass is covered by CAL, PENAL CODE § 602(j) (Deering 1986). which 
states in pertinent part: 
[E]very person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the 
following is guilty of a misdemeanor .... Entering any lands. 
whether unenclosed or enclosed by fence. for the purpose of 
injuring any property or property rights or with the intention 
of interfering with. obstructing, or injuring any lawful business 
or occupation carried on by the owner of the land. the owner's 
agent or by the person in lawful possession. 
2
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tivists had blocked the doors of an abortion clinic in La Mesa, 
California, by physically placing themselves between the clinic 
doors and clients attempting to enter.19 
Before trial commenced, Municipal Court Judge Larrie 
Brainard granted the prosecutor's in limine motion, excluding 
the defenses of necessity, defense of others, compliance with in-
ternational law, treaties or declarations, and mistake of fact.20 
The court also granted the prosecutor's separate motion in 
limine to exclude any mention or utterance of 50 specific words 
and phrases21 such as abortion, fetus, unborn, "death mill" and 
19. The case was People v. Carla Jean Bultsma, Case No. CI01464, Municipal Court 
of California, County of San Diego, EI Cajon Municipal District, 1990. Opening Brief for 
Appellant at 3-4, Zal (No. 91-55579). 
20. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582 
(1992). 
21. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Emergency Motion under 
Circuit Rule 27-3 at Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, Zal (No. 91-55579). The prosecution's in 
limine motion was actually in the form of two separate lists. The first list (Exhibit 1) 
read: 
WORDS TO EXCLUDE IN LIMINE BEFORE TRIAL 
(1) KILL 
(2) KILLER 
(3) BABY KILLER(S) 
(4) KILLING CENTERS 
(5) MURDER and MURDERER 
(6) FETUS 





(12) ANY REFERENCE TO GOD OR DEITY 
(13) "RELIGIOUS BELIEFS" IN ANY MANNER OR FORM 
(14) HITLER 
(15) NAZI or NAZISM 
(16) MANSLAUGHTER and/or CHILDSLAUGHTER 
(17) "RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN" 
(18) DEATH MILL 
(19) RESCUER 
(20) ANY WORD WHICH IS INCORPORATED IN NUMERAL (7) LISTED 
ABOVE. 
The second list (EXHIBIT 2) read: 
Pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 210 and 352, 
there should be no reference to the following items: 
... (7) No reference to why the defendant(s) were present if 
it includes religious beliefs or opinions on abortion, or any of 
the following: KILL, MURDER, SLAUGHTER, SLAYING, 
SLAY, DESTROY, DESTRUCTION, EXTERMINATION, 
BLOODLETTING, SACRIFICE, MARTYRDOM, EXECU-
3
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"baby killer."22 
At the beginning of trial, the trial court judge participated 
in voir dire of the jury.28 He asked prospective jurors if their 
feelings on abortion would prevent them from being impartial. 24 
During the January 1990 trial, Zal asked witnesses a total of 
thirteen questions which used one or more of the excluded words 
and phrases.211 Zal also asked witnesses seven questions which 
TION, HOMICIDE, GENOCIDE, FRATRICIDE, SORORI-
CIDE, PARRICIDE, INFANTICIDE, ABORTICIDE, FETI-
CIDE, BUTCHER, BUTCHERY, CARNAGE, MASSACRE, 
BLOODBATH, DECIMATION, MASS DESTRUCTION, 
CAIN, ASSASSIN, CUTTHROAT, THUG, GORILLA, NAZI, 
ERADICATION, MONSTER or MONSTROSITY. 
The court granted the prosecution's in limine motion with the exception of refer-
ences to "God or Deity" and "[r]eligious beliefs in any manner or form." Opening Brief 
for Appellant at 5, Zal (No. 91-55579). Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
words and phrases were "linked to the excluded defenses," Zal, 968 F.2d at 925, both Zal 
and the prosecuting attorney inferred that the words and the defenses were excluded in 
separate motions. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal (No. 91-55579); Brief of 
Appellee at 5, Zal (91-55579). Zal's opening brief states "[t]he trial court granted the 
prosecutor's motion to preclude the above listed defenses and to exclude all evidence 
pertaining thereto during any phase of the trial." Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal 
(No. 91-55579). "The prosecutor also submitted to the court before trial two lists con-
taining ... words and phrases to exclude in limine" (emphasis added). [d. Prosecuting 
attorney Cecil Steppe's opening brief states "[t]he trial court's order dealt with evidence, 
defenses, and inflammatory words before a jury." Brief of Appellee at 5, Zal (91-55579) 
(emphasis added). 
22. See supra note 21 for word list. 
23. Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal (91-55579). 
24. [d. 
25. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925-26. The questions were: 
- Can't we ask anything about baby-killing Your Honor? 
- Is the unborn baby a life you have sworn to protect? 
- Did you feel any obligation to protect the children who would be killed that day? 
- Officer, were you an unborn baby at some time in your life? 
- Wasn't the safety corridor the place where babies were taken to be killed? 
- How long have you been in the baby-killing business? 
- Does the oath you have taken to tell the truth mean anything to someone who is in 
the baby killing business? 
- What's done with the bodies of the babies killed by your employer? 
- Are you concerned that you may some day be charged with murder for your role in 
the abortion holocaust? 
- Do you think you will always protect the baby-killers? 
- Are those convictions worth the lives of unborn babies? 
- Now, is it from your own personal knowledge that you know two babies were saved 
from abortions that day? 
- Isn't that a poster of an unborn child sucking its thumb? 
(emphasis added to words on the "banned" list). 
4
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did not contain any of the banned words, but contained similar 
words and phrases.26 Zal was held in criminal contempt27 a total 
of 20 times26 for violating the court's in limine orders29 and sen-
tenced to 290 days in jail. 30 
Zal unsuccessfully appealed in both the federal district 
court and California state courts.31 Zal then filed a petition for 
26. [d. These questions were: 
- Is that the place where they empty the contents of a woman's uterus? 
- Are you familiar with those facilities where two persons go in and only one person 
comes out alive? 
- What time do the first victims arrive? 
- How do you feel about making a living off the blood of babies? 
- Are your paychecks bloodstained? 
- Where do the bodies go? 
- Did you know what babies they were referring to? 
- Do you know the time, date and place where a life was going to be taken? 
- What do you do when your oath to protect life conflicts with your duties? 
- Do you think perhaps the dog knew his duty to protect life better than the police 
officers? 
27. Criminal contempt is covered by CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (Deering 1986). Section 
166 provides in pertinent part that willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully 
issued by any court will result in contempt of court, a misdemeanor. [d. 
28. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. Sometimes Zal was cited only once for more than one use 
of a word or phrase. [d. 
29. Order Adjudging Contempt (C101464B, C, E-M): 
During in limine motions the Court ruled that the trial would 
be restricted to the charge of trespass and that abortion, any 
"necessity defense," and "the rights of the unborn" would not 
be issues presented to the jury. Counsel and the defendants 
were specifically instructed not to attempt to improperly influ-
ence or proselytize the jury on the above issues .... The Court 
allowed attorney Cyrus Zal the opportunity to explain his ac-
tions after each citation for contempt. Mr. Zal stated that he 
'welcomed' said citations and had incurred same intentionally 
to further his cause. The court finds each act of contempt was 
done intentionally to improperly influence and proselytize the 
jury in direct contravention of court orders. 
30. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579). 
31. [d. at 3-4. Cyrus Zal filed petitions for writ of habeas corpu~ in the Superior 
Court of California, San Diego County, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, 
and a petition for hearing and stay of proceedings in the California Supreme Court. Each 
petition was denied. Zal additionally filed petitions for habeas corpus/prohibition/man-
damus and for bail in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January 
18, 1991. The Court granted bail, but denied the petition. Subsequently on February 8, 
1991, Zal filed petitions for habeas corpus/prohibition/mandamus arid for bail to remain 
in force in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District. The court granted the order 
keeping bail in force, but denied the petition. On March 28, 1991, Zal filed a petition for 
review and for bail to remain in force with the California Supreme Court. The petition 
was denied. Turning to the Federal Courts, Zal filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. This petition 
5
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writ of habeas corpus with the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.82 Zal's habeas corpus petition claimed that 
the trial court's in limine order violated the following: his First 
Amendment88 free speech rights, his clients' Sixth8• and Four-
teenth Amendment811 rights, and the Fifth88 and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights87 of the unborn. 
Although Zal had completed his sentence, the Ninth Circuit 
was also denied. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. The first amendment provides that "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
34. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (rights to trial by jury and 
assistance of counsel). The sixth amendment provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
35. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (right to due process). The 
fourteenth amendment provides that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
36. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (right to life). The fifth 
amendment provides that: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
37. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Zal (No. 91-55579) (rights to life and equal 
protection). See supra note 35 for full text of the fourteenth amendment. 
6
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Court of Appeals granted review. The court explained that the 
contempt order was· not a moot point because, if allowed to 
stand, Zal would potentially face additional sanctions from the 
California Bar. 38 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. CHALLENGING COURT ORDERS IN CALIFORNIA 
Whether a contemnor can challenge a court order after he 
has knowingly violated the order varies in different jurisdictions. 
In federal courts, and in many state courts, a "collateral bar" 
rule is in effect.39 This rule prohibits a court order from being 
"collaterally" challenged after it has been violated."o 
1. The Collateral Bar Rule 
The collateral bar rule provides that a person cannot chal-
lenge a court order after that order has been violated.·1 The rule 
is perhaps best demonstrated by the United States Supreme 
Court Case Walker v. City of Birmingham."2 In Walker, the 
court upheld an Alabama rule which provided that a constitu-
tional challenge to a court order could only be raised before the 
order was· violated."3 The defendants in Walker knowingly dis-
obeyed a temporary injunction that enjoined them from parad-
ing without a permit."· After the defendants held a civil rights 
demonstration in violation of the injunction, they sought to 
challenge the constitutionality of the injunction, arguing that it 
was vague and overbroad."1i The Alabama Supreme Court re-
fused to perform a full constitutional analysis of the injunction, 
reasoning that it had already been defied."6 
The United States Supreme Court admitted that the in-
38. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. 
39. See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L.Ed. 2d 
582 (1992). 
40. See generally Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
41. Id. at 313-14. 
42. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
43. Id. at 313-14. 
44. Id. at 309-10. 
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junction may have been constitutionally defective, but explained 
that the collateral bar rule provided that a constitutional analy-
sis only needed to be performed if the issuing court lacked juris-
diction, or the defendants had violated the injunction unknow-
ingly.'7 As neither of these situations applied to the defendants, 
the Court upheld the defendants' contempt citations."8 The 
Court relied on its earlier decision in Howat v. Kansas"s to ex-
plain that: 
An injunction ... must be obeyed ... however 
erroneous the action of the court may be .... It is 
for the court of first instance to determine the 
question of the validity of the law, and until its 
decision is reversed for error by orderly review, ei-
ther by itself or a higher court, its orders based on 
its decisions are to be respected, and disobedience 
of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be 
punished. 50 
At least one lower federal court has applied the collateral 
bar rule to prevent abortion protesters from collaterally chal-
lenging a temporary restraining order. In New York State NOW 
v. Terry/,I the defendants blocked abortion clinic facilities in vi-
olation of a restraining order .112 The court refused to allow a 
First Amendment challenge to the order because it had already 
been violated. liS 
2. Berry - The California Rule 
California does not follow the collateral bar rule. II" The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case In re Berryllll explained that orders 
47. [d. at 311-12. 
48. [d. at 321. 
49. 258 U.S. 181 (1922). 
50. [d. at 189-90. 
51. New York State NOW v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 
52. [d. at 1326. 
53. [d. at 1334. 
54. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927. 
55. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968). The defendants in Berry disobeyed a temporary re-
straining order which prohibited them from picketing and engaging in other strike activi-
. ties. [d. at 277-78. They were aware of the restraining order, but believed that it "suf-
fered from constitutional defects which rendered it void," so they decided to continue 
strike activities as planned. [d. at 277. After they were held in contempt, they sought to 
challenge the order as overbroad. [d. at 282. The County of Sacramento (which had ob-
tained the order against the defendants) argued that the defendants were barred from 
8
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issued without jurisdiction are void.1I8 Furthermore, in Califor-
nia, if an order is found to be unconstitutional, it will be consid-
ered to have been issued without jurisdiction.1I7 Therefore, in 
California, a person affected by a court order has two options:1I8 
(1) comply with the order while seeking a judicial declaration to 
its validity, or (2) disobey the order and raise "jurisdictional 
contentions" when punished for violation of the order.1I9 A per-
son following the latter route will be vindicated if the court or-
der is found unconstitutiona1.80 
The main difference between the Berry rule and the collat-
eral bar rule is that when the constitutionality of an order is 
challenged subsequent to violation, the Berry rule requires a 
constitutional analysis81 while the collateral bar rule does not.82 
In comparing Walker with Berry, the California Supreme Court 
concluded "[i]n California ... the rule followed is considerably 
more consistent with the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms. "83 
B. IN LIMINE ORDERS 
1. Use of In Limine Orders 
The in limine84 order is a procedural device which precludes 
opposing counsel from presenting evidence to the jury.811 Its pur-
collaterally challenging the order because the issuing court had both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants when the order was issued. Id. at 279-80. The 
California Supreme Court rejected this argument and determined that an order lacked 
jurisdiction if it was unconstitutional. Id. at 280. The court accordingly granted the de-
fendants' writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 286. 
56. Berry, 436 P.2d at 280. 
57.Id. 
58. Id. at 281. 
59. [d. 
60.Id. 
61. Berry, 436 P.2d at 279 ("It is well settled that a court is without jurisdiction to 
subject a citizen to criminal prosecution for violation of an unconstitutional ... court 
order . . . relief is not barred by the failure of petitioners to challenge directly . . . . "). 
62. Walker, 388 U.S. at 316-17 ("The breadth and vagueness of the injunction itself 
would ... unquestionably be subject to substantial constitutional question. But the way 
to raise that question was to apply to the Alabama courts to have the injunction modi-
fied or dissolved."). 
63. Berry, 436 P.2d at 282 (referring to the collateral bar rule). 
64. In limine is defined as "[o]n or at the threshold; at the very beginning; prelimi-
narily." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990). 
65. See generally Canda<;e C. Fetscher, The Motion in limine, A Useful Procedural 
9
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pose is "to avoid the unfairness caused by the presentation of 
prejudicial or objectionable evidence to the jury."66 Although 
prejudicial evidence is usually the type of evidence sought to be 
excluded,67 the scope of the motion includes any kind of evi-
dence that could be excluded at tria1.68 Additionally, the scope 
of the motion encompasses both physical and testamentary evi-
dence.69 At least one federal court has warned against excluding 
broad categories of evidence.7o 
Not specifically authorized by statute,71 the in limine order 
is recognized as within the court's inherent power.72 Violating an 
in limine order can result in a charge of contempt of court.7S 
The in limine order is obtained when an attorney makes a 
motion in limine requesting the judge to exclude certain items 
of the opposing party's evidence.74 This motion is usually made 
prior to trial, but can be made any time before the evidence 
sought to be excluded is introduced.7I1 There is no specific form a 
motion in limine must take.76 
An in limine motion may request either a "prohibitive-pre-
liminary" order or a "prohibitive:absolute" order." The prohibi-
tive-preliminary order restricts an attorney from presenting the 
Device, 35 MONT. L. REV. 362 (1974). 
66. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Ct., 245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 884 (1988), 
cert. dismissed, Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 490 U.S. 1086 (1989). 
67. Fetscher, supra note 65, at 362. 
68. See Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (irrelevant evidence is within the scope of the 
motion). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1992) (evidence may be excluded in one of 
four ways: (1) danger of undue prejudice; (2) danger of confusing issues; (3) danger of 
jury being misled; or (4) danger of undue consumption of time). 
69. Ganey v. Doran, 236 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (1987). 
70. Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975) (in limine order excluded any mention of three related cases, 
order was upheld because the attorney did not object to the order at trial, but the appel-
late judge warned against excluding such broad categories of evidence in the future). 
71. Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884. See also J. Patrick Hazel, The Motion in Limine: A 
Texas Proposal, 21 Hous. L. REV. 919, 933 n.3 (1988). 
72. Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884. 
73. See supra note 27 for contempt statute. 
74. Henry B. Rothblatt & David H. Leroy, The Motion In Limine in Criminal Tri-
als: A Technique for the Pretrial Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L.J. 611, 613 
(1972). 
75. 3 BERNARD WITKIN. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 2011 (3d ed. 1986). 
76.Id. 
77. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 74, at 615-16. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/8
1993] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 
excluded evidence until he or she has gained express permission 
from the judge during trial. 78 The prohibitive-absolute order 
prohibits counsel from offering the excluded evidence or men-
tioning it in any way at any time during the triaP9 
2. Use of the In Limine Order to Exclude Entire Defenses 
Use of the in limine order to exclude entire defenses is not 
uncommon.80 The most commonly excluded defenses are neces-
sity and duress.81 In fact, in limine orders excluding the defense 
of necessity have been widely accepted in cases similar to Zal's.82 
Orders excluding the defenses of mistake of fact83 and defense of 
others84 have also been granted in abortion clinic trespass cases. 
3. In Limine Exclusion of Specific Words 
Prior to Zal u. Steppe, only one reported case used a motion 
in limine to exclude a specific phrase. In Cook u. Philadelphia 
Transportation Company,8" the court issued an in limine order 
precluding use of the term "Crazy Bar" to identify the property 
across the street from where the plaintiff/pedestrian was struck 
by a car.86 "Crazy· Bar" was disallowed because there was no 
78. [d. 
79. [d. 
80. Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Si· 
lencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1283 (1987). The Colbert article 
provides an in-depth analysis of the history and use of the motion in limine. It particu-
larly focuses on in limine exclusion of entire defenses. Additionally, the article demon-
strates how an in limine motion to exclude over 30 words and phrases was rejected by a 
trial court. The Colbert article was cited in Judge Noonan's dissenting and concurring 
opinion in Zal to explain the initial development of the motion in limine in criminal 
trials. Zal, 968 F.2d at 934. 
81. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1284. 
82. See, e.g., Allison v. City of Birmingham, 580 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1991), cert. denied, 580 So.2d 1390 (Ala. 1991); People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied, 520 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. 1988); State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 
717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1982); State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 187 (N.D. 1991); City of Dayton v. Drake, 590 
N.E.2d 319, 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State v. Clowes, 801 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Or. 1990); 
State v. Olsen, 299 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
83. Allison, 580 So.2d at 1379. 
84. [d. (mistaken belief that the unborn are persons). 
85. 199 A.2d 446 (Pa. 1964). 
86. [d. at 447. 
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proof that the plaintiff was intoxicated when hit.87 The court 
reasoned that reference to the "Crazy Bar" would tend to lead 
jurors to infer that the plaintiff was intoxicated.88 
Several times, however, attorneys' attempts to exclude 
words or phrases in limine have been rejected. In one Eighth 
Circuit products liability case,89 a tire manufacturer sought 
to exclude the phrases "widow maker," "man killer," "killer 
wheel," and "bone breaker."90 The manufacturer claimed that 
these terms were prejudicial and inflammatory.91 The manufac-
turer's motion in limine was denied.92 
In another federal case,93 a defendant filed a motion in 
limine to prevent any mention of the word "conspiracy."94 His 
in limine motion was denied because the court found that the 
plaintiff had a colorable conspiracy claim.911 
Prior to Zal, no reported cases addressed a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude a large number of words. However, in the 
unreported case United States u. Rosenberg,96 the government 
made a motion in limine to exclude at least 31 specific phrases.97 
The prosecuting attorneys did not submit a memorandum of law 
or cite any case to support their motion.98 In contrast, the de-
fense counsel argued that if the motion was granted, it would 
prevent his clients from receiving a fair tria1.99 Additionally, the 
defense counsel argued that the motion was a "wholly irregular 
... extraordinary and overbroad request made without any 
showing as to the irrelevance of the words or matters [the gov-
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985). 
90. [d. at 1333. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. (no reason for the denial was given). 
93. Peuntes v. Sullivan, 425 F.Supp. 249 (W.D. Tex. 1977). 
94. [d. at 249. 
95. [d. at 253. 
96. Crim. No. 84-360 (D.N.J. tiled Feb. 28 1985), aft'd, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986). 
See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1307-09. 
97. Notice of Motion at 3-4, Rosenberg (Crim. No. 84-360) (words included terrorist, 
revolution, anarchist, combatants, socialism, fascism, urban guerillas). See Colbert, 
supra note 80, at 1308 for full list. 
98. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1308. 
99. [d. 
12
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ernment] wishes to exclude."loo The motion was denied. lOl 
C. FIRST AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS 
Governments can regulate speech in two ways: (1) prior re-
straint, and (2) subsequent punishment. The United States Su-
preme Court has held that the First Amendment protects 
against both forms of regulation. l02 When a person challenges 
the First Amendment constitutionality of a government regula-
tion of speech, the courts will generally balance the govern-
ment's need to regulate against the challenger's right to 
speech. lOS However, a court's substantive First Amendment anal-
ysis may vary depending on whether the regulation was imposed 
prospectively (prior restraint), or after the communication has 
occurred (subsequent punishment).104 
1. Prior Restraints on Attorney Speech 
The term "prior restraint" is used to describe judicial orders 
restricting communications before they occur. 1011 Restraint of 
speech prior to its exercise presents a separate issue from regula-
tion and discipline after the fact.l06 In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has determined that "[p]rior restraints on 
speech are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights."107 Although the term "prior restraint" 
100. Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Government's Motion in limine at 1-2, 
Rosenberg (Crim. No. 84-360). See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1308. 
101. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1309. 
102. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-102 (1979) ("First 
Amendment protection reaches beyond prior restraints .... Whether we view the statute 
as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction ... is not dispositive because even the latter 
action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity."). 
103. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1230 (1984). 
104. See infra note 105 for a definition of prior restraint. 
105. MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984) (the term 
"prior restraint" can also be used to describe administrative orders); see also BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990) ("A system of prior restraint is any scheme which 
gives public officials the power to deny the use of a forum in advance of its actual 
expression."). 
106. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) ("Cases which deal 
with punishment based on contempt, however, deal with problems substantially different 
from those raised by prior restraint."). See also State v. Russell, 610 P.2d 1122, 1126 
(Kan. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). 
107. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559. 
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has only been applied to out of court utterances, prior restraint 
analysis is arguably not limited to that context.108 The court in 
In re Halkin109 suggested that the fact a court order presented 
many of the same dangers as a prior restraint was enough to 
I 
require "close scrutiny of its impact on protected First Amend-
ment expression. "110 
The rationale for a separate prior restraint analysis was ar-
ticulated in Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad. III There, 
the court stated: 
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who 
abuse rights of speech after they break the law 
than to throttle them and all others beforehand. 
It is always difficult to know in advance what an 
individual will say, and the line between legiti-
mate and illegitimate speech is often so finely 
drawn that the risks of free-wheeling censorship 
are formidable. 112 
Zal is the first reported case that challenges a restriction of 
an attorney's speech in the courtroom as a prior restraint.11s 
Perhaps this is because prior to Zal, judges had not attempted 
to regulate the use of certain words in their courtrooms except 
by issuing contempt citations after inappropriate communica-
tions occurred.11• However, courts have previously applied prior 
restraint analysis to judicial orders regulating an attorney's ex-
tra-judicial speech during pending cases.lUi 
When presented with a prior restraint of extra-judicial 
speech regarding a pending case, courts have applied several bal-
ancing tests. Among tests utilized are the "clear and present 
108. But cf. Scott v. Anderson, 405 So.2d 228, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (clear 
and present danger test only applies to out of court statements). 
109. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (analyzing whether an order that prohibited an 
attorney from disclosing information obtained through discovery was constitutionally 
deficient). 
. 110. [d. at 186. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has warned against 
using the term "prior restraint" as a "talismanic test." Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 
354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957). 
111. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
112. [d. at 559. 
113. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928. 
It4. See infra notes 120·28 and accompanying text for an analysis of contempt. 
115. See, e.g., Halkin, 598 F.2d at 183·86. 
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danger" test,116 and the "substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice" test. ll7 These tests balance First Amendment rights 
against government interests and require that restrictions are 
"narrowly tailored"ll8 to assure that they do not infringe upon 
constitutional rights. ll9 
2. Subsequent Punishment for Attorneys' Speech - the 
Contempt Order 
Contempt is generally defined as "an act committed in or 
out of the court's presence, that tends to impede, embarrass, or 
obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties."12o When the 
contemptuous act is performed in court, it is "direct con-
tempt."121 A court will issue a civil contempt citation if its pri-
mary purpose is to preserve litigant rights.122 When the court's 
primary purpose is to punish, it will issue a criminal contempt 
citation.123 
Like prior restraints, contempt citations must be able to 
withstand substantive First Amendment analysis. In In re Mc-
Connell,124 the United States Supreme Court held that courts 
were limited in contempt cases to "the least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed." l2II Any broader contempt power, the 
court explained, "would permit too great inroads on the proce-
dural safeguards of the Bill of Rights."12e 
116. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,388 (1962). See infra note 128 for a definition of 
the clear and present danger test. 
117. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) ("The regula-
tion of attorneys' speech is limited - it applies only to speech that is substantially likely 
to have 'a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral to points of view ... and it merely 
postpones the attorney's comments until after the trial."). 
118. See Carol v. President and Comm'r of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) 
(" An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrow-
est terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by the constitutional 
mandate."). 
119. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723. 
120. In re Shortridge, 34 P. 227, 229 (Cal. 1893). 
121. Ex Parte Terry, 128·U.S. 289, 319 (1888). In contrast, a contemptuous act done 
outside the presence of the court is called "constructive contempt." See id. 
122. Morelli v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 328, 388 (1969). 
123. Id. 
124. 370 U.S_ 230 (1962). 
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Two common tests used for balancing contemptuous state-
ments against First Amendment rights are whether the state-
ment constitutes: (1) "an imminent threat to the administration 
of justice,"127 or (2) "a clear and present danger to the orderly 
administration of justice."l28 
D. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF ATTORNEYS 
Jurisdictions differ as to the extent of First Amendment 
free speech protections they afford attorneys. Two of the con-
texts courts have used to evaluate attorneys' free speech rights 
are prior restraints on extrajudicial speech,129 and contempt ci-
tations for in-court statements. ISO However, prior to Zal, the 
courts had not considered the possibility of a prior restraint on 
an attorney's free speech rights in the courtroom. lSI 
. In the contexts that have been considered, two different 
views have emerged. 
1. A Full' Protection View 
One federal district court has held that "[l]itigation itself is 
a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. It is 
indisputable that attorneys and parties retain their First 
Amendment rights even as participants in the judicial pro-
cess."lS2 A New York state court has similarly declared that 
"[t]he freedom of expression protection afforded by the First 
Amendment ... unquestionably extends to the courtroom."188 
127. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 
F.2d 459, 474 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980), and aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 
(1981). 
128. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1941) ("The clear and 
present danger doctrine requires a weighing of evidence and a determination of whether 
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present. danger that they will bring about a substantial interference with the 
orderly administration of justice."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 381 (1962); Estrada 
v. Bailey, 563 F. Supp. 222, 223 (W.D. Tex 1983). 
129. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. 
131. Zal argued that the trial court's in limine word-ban was a prior restraint on his 
first amendment rights. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928. 
132. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that an order prohib-
iting extrajudicial disclosure of discovery materials without giving reasons was deficient). 
133. Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (App. Div. 1991), appeal dis-
16
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Another state court has suggested that "[s]tatements made in 
the presence of the court or outside the presence of the court are 
protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech. "134 
The Ninth Circuit case Hawk v. Cardoza 136 is an example of 
how attorney free speech rights have been protected. There, the 
court devised a test that balanced an attorney's First Amend-
ment rights in the courtroom against the need for order in the 
judicial process.136 These holdings are consistent with the oft 
used expression "attorneys do not lose their constitutional rights 
at the courthouse door."137 
2. A Limited Protection View 
Another line of cases has expressed that attorneys' rights 
while participating in the trial process are limited. These limita-
tions are usually based on the theory that lawyers are "officers of 
the court" and thus can be regulated by less demanding 
standards.138 
The recent Supreme Court case Gentile v. State Bar of Ne-
vada139 seems to follow the second line of cases. For litigants, 
Gentile has modified the "courthouse door" expression: 
missed, 582 N.E.2d 603 (N.Y. 1991) (upholding an attorney's first amendment right to 
wear a "ready to strike" badge in a non-jury courtroom). 
134. Garland v. State, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133 (Ga. 1985) (contempt citation for an ex-
trajudicial statement to the press). 
135. 575 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1978). 
136. Id. at 735 (contempt case upheld contempt citations but warned that factors to 
be considered in such cases included the length of trial, surrounding controversy, prior 
warnings from the trial judge and prior conduct of the contemnor). The test used was 
"grave danger to the administration of justice." Id. 
137. Levine v. United States District Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). See also Zal, 968 F.2d at 927; Halkin, 598 F.2d at 186. 
138. See, e.g., State ex rei. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 I:'.2d 958, 968 (Okla: 
1988); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982); Kuiper v. District Ct., 632 P.2d 694, 
697 (Mont. 1981). 
139. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). In Gentile, an attorney gave a press conference hours 
after his client was indicted on criminal charges. Id. at 2723. The Nevada State Bar filed 
a complaint alleging that the attorney violated a Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting 
an attorney from making an extrajudicial statement which would have "a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. The Court found 
that the Nevada Supreme Court rule was (1) void for vagueness as applied by the Ne-
vada Supreme Court because its safe harbor provisions led the attorney to believe that 
he could give a press conference without being disciplined, Id. at 2731, and (2) the "sub-
stantiallikelihood of material prejudice" test satisfied the first amendment. Id. at 2745. 
17
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"[a]lthough litigants don't lose their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door, those rights may be subordinated to other 
interests that arise in this setting."14o For attorneys, Gentile 
stated in dicta that "[a] lawyer's right to free speech is ex-
tremely circumscribed in the courtroom."141 
Under Gentile, it is unclear which substantive standards the 
United States Supreme Court would employ in analyzing an at-
torney's free speech rights in the courtroom today. Specifically, 
the Gentile court held that attorneys' extra-judicial statements 
could be regulated under the "less demanding" "substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice" test employed by the Nevada 
Supreme Court.142 The Court explained that adherence to the 
precepts of the judicial system allowed attorney speech to be 
regulated under a less demanding standard.143 Accordingly, the 
Court determined that the "less demanding" test was a "consti-
tutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment 
rights of attorneys in pending cases and the state's interest in 
fair trials. "144 
Although Gentile stated that attorney courtroom rights 
were extremely circumscribed, it did not explicitly provide a dif-
ferent balancing test for those rights: However, Gentile did ex-
press that "blanket rules restricting speech of defense attorneys 
should not be accepted without careful First Amendment scru-
tiny."1411 Thus, Gentile seems to provide some protection for at-
torney speech in the courtroom. Which substantive tests the 
Court would employ is unknown. 
140. [d. at 2744. 
141. [d. at 2722. 
142. [d. at 2744-45 (less demanding than the "clear and present danger" test). 
143. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744 ("Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are 
key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adher-
ence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct."). 
144. [d. at 2745. 
145. [d. at 2735. 
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITy146 
1. Jurisdiction 
To grant jurisdiction, the court needed to address three is-
sues.147 First, a habeas corpus petition generally becomes moot 
after a prisoner is released from custody.148 Zal had already 
served his contempt sentence and had been released from 
prison.149 However, the court noted that Robbins v. Christian-
son llSO recognized an exception to the mootness rule when the 
prisoner could show that he would suffer collateral legal conse-
quences if his conviction was allowed to stand.lII1 The court rec-
ognized that Zal could face discipline by the California State Bar 
if his contempt citations were allowed to stand. I112 Thus, the 
court found that Zal's habeas corpus petition was not moot. I113 
Second, the court noted that habeas petitions could only be 
granted for violations of the United States Constitution, federal 
statutes or treaties. I114 The court focused on Zal's First Amend-
ment claim and cited Levine v. District Court155 in support of 
its determination that Zal had constitutional rights in this situa-
tion. 156 Levine held that "attorneys ... do not lose their consti-
tutional rights at the courthouse door."1117 
146. Judge Farris wrote a one-justice majority opinion. 
147. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582 
(1992). 
148. [d. at 926 (citing Robbins v. Christianson, 904 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1990». 
149. [d. 
150. 904 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1990). 
151. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. at 926-27. 28 U.S.C. § 2554(a) (1974) provides: 
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a dis-
trict court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States. 
155. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). 
156. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927. 
157. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595. 
19
McGinn: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
54 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:35 
Third, although many jurisdictions have adopted the collat-
eral bar rule, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that California 
had explicitly elected not to follow that rule. l l!8 The court cited 
In re Berry1ll9 for this proposition and noted that, under Berry, 
"a person, under California law, may disobey the order and raise 
his jurisdictional contentions when he is sought to be pun-
ished. "160 And, under Berry, an order that is unconstitutional is 
an order without jurisdiction.16l 
The court explained that while Berry was a California pro-
cedural standard that allowed Zal to present his constitutional 
claim, the analysis was properly concluded using substantive 
federal standards.162 
2. The First Amendment Claim 
The court first turned to Zal's First Amendment claim.163 
Zal argued that the trial court's in limine orders were prior re-
straints on his First Amendment free speech rights.164 As prior 
restraints, Zal claimed the orders had to be analyzed under the 
"clear and present danger" standard.161! 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument.166 It concluded 
that the standards set forth in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 167 
and Sacher v. United States 168 were appropriate to measure at-
158. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text for an ex-
planation of the collateral bar rule. 
159. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968). See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Berry. 
160. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927 (citing Berry, 436 P.2d at 281). 
161. [d. 
162. [d. at 927 ("There is only one substantive standard - that prescribed by federal 
law."). 
163. [d. 
164. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. at 928. 
167. III S. Ct. 2720 (1991). See supra note 139 for a discussion of Gentile. 
168. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). In Sacher, an attorney was cited for contempt of court for 
repeatedly provoking useless bickering and insulting the trial court judge during a long 
trial. [d. at 4. Instead of issuing contempt citations at the time of the attorney's con-
temptuous behavior, the judge issued contempt citations at the end of the trial. [d. at 3. 
The attorney did not dispute the fact that the judge could have properly held him in 
contempt at the time his contemptuous behavior occurred, but he believed that, at the 
time the trial had ended, the judge's summary contempt power had expired. [d. at 7. 
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torneys' rights in the courtroom. leD Sacher expressed that the 
zeal of counsel is important, but can disrupt the judicial process: 
unless it is supervised and controlled by a neutral 
judge representing the overriding social interest 
in impartial justice. . . . Of course, it is the right 
of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, 
even if it appears farfetched and untenable, to ob-
tain the court's considered ruling. Full enjoyment 
of that right, with due allowance for the heat of 
controversy, will be protected by appellate courts 
when infringed by trial courts. But if the ruling 
is adverse, it is not counsel's right to resist it or 
to insult the judge - his right is only respectfully 
to preserve his point for appeal. During trial, 
lawyers must speak, each in his own time and 
within his allowed time, and with relevance and 
moderation. These are such obvious matters that 
we should not remind the bar of them were it not 
for the misconceptions manifest in this case.17O 
Gentile reaffirmed Sacher's holding that if a ruling is ad-
verse, counsel can only preserve the point for appeal. 171 Gentile 
additionally determined that "lawyers representing clients in 
pending cases could be regulated under a less demanding stan-
dard than the 'clear and present danger' test established for reg-
ulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart."172 Fur-
ther, Gentile stated in dicta that "[i]t is unquestionable that in 
the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right 
to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely circumscribed."178 
Using these guidelines from Sacher and Gentile, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that the trial court's in limine orders did riot 
violate Zal's First Amendment rights because they did not in-
fringe on his right to preserve his or his clients' right to ap-
peal.174 Additionally, the court noted that Zal could have prop-
The Court rejected the attorney's argument and held that summary contempt citations 
can properly be issued after a trial has ended. [d. at 11. 
169. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928. 
170. [d. at 928 (quoting Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8-9) (emphasis in Zal). 
171. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (citing Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743). 
172. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
543 (1976)). 
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erly filed for an interlocutory appeal after the in limine order 
was issued. 1711 
The court next addressed arguments presented in Judge 
Noonan's dissent. Judge Noonan argued that the United States 
Supreme Court case In re Little176 applied First Amendment 
protection to broad and even obscene· language in the court-
room.177 In rejecting this argument, the court observed that Lit-
tle was inapposite because it involved the violation of a general 
contempt statute whereas Zal violated a specific court order.178 
The court also rejected Judge Noonan's "interpretation"179 
of Sacher which required that an attorney "make impossible an 
orderly and speedy discharge of the case" to be held in con-
tempt.180 The court declared that this requirement was a misin-
terpretation and reiterated that Sacher held that an attorney's 
only right is to preserve his point for appeal. The court addi-
tionally noted that the holding in Sacher181 was not altered by 
Berry and its progeny.182 It explained that Berry "provides only 
that a contempt citation is void if its underlying order is 
unconstitutional. "188 
Finally, the court rejected Judge Noonan's argument that 
Zal should not be punished for questions that did not contain 
words banned in the in limine order. 184 The court found that Zal 
had intentionally violated the trial court's orders excluding de-
fenses. 1811 It concluded that Zal "knew this" and therefore did 
not raise an argument about non-included words in his briefs or 
175. [d. 
176. 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam). See infra note 218 for a discussion of Little. 
177. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935. 
178. [d. 
179. Although Judge Noonan had pointed out that the defendant in Sacher did 
whatever he could to make impossible a speedy and orderly dispatch of the case, he did 
not appear to argue that Sacher was inapplicable because Zal had not acted similarly. 
See Zal, 968 F.2d at 935. Nevertheless, the court interpreted Judge Noonan's discussion 
of Sacher accordingly. [d. at 928. 
180. [d. at 928. 




184. [d. at 929. 
185. [d. 
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oral arguments. 186 
In closing its First Amendment analysis, the court con-
cluded: "[t]he only question before us is who controls the trial. 
Under our current system, the trial judge is charged with pre-
serving the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of issues. 
Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of 
the First Amendment. We hold nothing more. "187 
3. Zal's Other Claims 
Zal also argued that the contempt citations issued against 
him violated his clients' Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury 
and effective assistance of counsel, and his clients' Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process of law.188 The court concluded 
that Zal had standing to assert these claims because Zal had al-
leged "a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants' alleg-
edly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief."18S 
In addressing Zal's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims, the court 'only analyzed the impact of the defenses which 
were excluded in limine. ISO It determined that Zal's clients' 
rights could not have been violated by defense exclusion unless 
the court erred "as a matter of federal law" in excluding any of 
the defenses. lSI The court held that Zal had no right to present 
evidence simply to bring out his clients' 'reasons for their 
actions. ls2 
The only defense that the court analyzed individually was 
the necessity defense. ISS It found that Zal's clients could not in-
voke the necessity defensels4 because they were not seeking to 
186. [d. 
187. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984». 
190. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 ("[TJhe evidentiary orders did not violate Zal's clients' 




193. See id. 
194. According to the Ninth Circuit, the necessity defense requires that "(1) they 
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avert a legally recognized harm.ls6 The court emphasized further 
that Zal's clients had legal alternatives available to them that 
did not involve violating the law. ISS These alternatives included 
marching, distributing literature and telephone solicitation.ls7 
Although Zal also presented constitutional claims on behalf 
of the unborn, the court did not analyze them.19s Instead, it sim-
ply stated that it would address his non-First Amendment 
claims "without deciding whether' a fetus has Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights."199 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed all of Zal's contempt citations.20o 
B. THE CONCURRENCE20l 
Judge Trott concurred with the majority opmlOn, but 
wanted to expand on the First Amendment "right" of an attor-
ney or his client to speak freely in the courtroom, and the Sixth 
Amendment "right" to jury nullification202 of the law.20s 
1. -First Amendment Issues 
Judge Trott rejected Zal's argument that attorneys retain 
their First Amendment rights in the courtroom.204 He concluded 
that the cases which provided that "attorneys ... do not lose 
their constitutional rights at the courthouse door"206 were inap-
were faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to prevent 
imminent harm; (3)' they reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between 
their conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) they had no legal alternatives to vio-
lating the law." Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 (citing United States v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238, 
1239-40 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2980 (1992». 
195. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. (citing Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350-52 
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989». 
198. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 929. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. at 925. 
201. Judge Trott authored a separate concurring opinion. 
202. Jury nullification has been described by the United States Supreme Court as 
"the naked power to return a verdict of 'not gUilty' even when acquittal is inconsistent 
with the law given by the court." Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1932). 
203. Zal, 968 F.2d at 930. 
204. Id. at 931. 
. 205. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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plicable, reasoning that those cases involved out-of-court com-
munications with the media as opposed to courtroom speech.206 
Judge Trott" noted that attorneys have no independent First 
Amendment rights in the courtroom but only have the rights de-
rived from their clients' trial rights. 207 Judge Trott reiterated 
that under Gentile and Sacher, an attorney's rights in a court-
room are "extremely circumscribed" and that an attorney could 
only preserve his point for appeaP08 However, he suggested that 
Gentile and Sacher were potentially misleading.209 Although 
they discussed attorneys' First Amendment rights, they were ac-
tually discussing the rights derived through clients which al-
lowed attorneys to speak.210 That, Judge Trott explained, "is 
why Gentile uses quotation marks when it discusses a lawyer's 
right to free speech."211 Accordingly, he concluded, under Sacher 
and Gentile, an attorney's only First Amendment remedy when 
faced with an adverse judicial order is his objection to the 
order.212 
Judge Trott further argued that traditional First Amend-
ment analysis distinguishes between the types of forums in 
which speakers seek to express their rights.213 Judge Trott 
206. Zal, 968 F.2d at 931. 
207. [d. at 931-32. 
208. [d. at 931. 
209. [d. 
210. [d. 
211. Zal, 968 F.2d at 931. 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 932. Traditional public forums include streets, parks and places which 
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and ... have been used 
for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions." Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In such 
traditional public fora, the state has no right to exclude all speech and can only enforce 
content-based exclusion of speech if the exclusion is narrowly drawn and serves a com-
pelling state interest. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). The second type of fo-
rum includes public property "which the State has opened for use by the public as a 
place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). This type of forum is called a "designated open forum" and is subject 
to the same standards of first amendment regulation as a traditional public forum. [d. at 
46. The third type of forum is the "non-public forum" which includes publicly-owned 
facilities which have been "dedicated to use for either communicative or non-communi-
cative purposes but have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by 
the general public." Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1376 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 253 (1990) (citing United States Postal Servo v. Council of Green-
burgh, 453 U.S. 114, 131 (1981». In this type of forum, the state may "reserve the forum 
for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on 
25
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pointed out that the courtroom was not technically a public fo-
rum.2U Although the courtroom met the "public forum" criteria 
of being a place traditionally devoted to assembly and debate, it 
never had been devoted to "free debate."m Traditionally, the 
courtroom had only been 'open to debate within the confines set 
by the trial judge and the law.216 Since Zal had no independent 
free speech rights in the courtroom, and his clients had no right 
to use words forbidden by the trial judge, neither was protected 
by the First Amendment.217 
Concluding his First Amendment analysis, Judge Trott re-
jected Judge Noonan's assertion that broad and even obscene 
language in the courtroom is constitutionally protected.218 Judge 
Trott determined that the case Judge Noonan cited for that pro-
position was inapplicable, reasoning that its decision was based 
upon Fourteenth Amendment due process rights rather than 
First Amendment free speech rights.219 
2. Jury Nullification 
Judge Trott also discussed Zal's Sixth Amendment jury trial 
and assistance of counsel claims.220 Zal had argued that his cli-
ents had a right to explain their actions (through Zal) to the 
jury.221 Both Judge Trott and Judge Noonan found that each of 
Zal's clients actually had been given one chance to explain why 
they had blocked the abortion clinic doors.222 Although Judge 
Trott noted that Zal's clients had been allowed to explain, he 
disagreed with Judge Noonan's opinion that this explanation 
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi-
cials oppose the speaker's view." Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 131. 
214. Zal, 968 F.2d at 932. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 933. 
218. Id. at 932. 
219. Id. The case was In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), which reversed a summary 
contempt conviction of a pro se defendant who had argued in closing that he was a 
political prisoner and the trial court judge was biased against him. (He also called the 
judge a 'M-_ F-_,' but that expletive was not part of the case). Zal, 968 F.2d at 
932. 
220. Id. at 930. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 930-31. 
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was a "right."223 
Judge Trott was convinced that an attorney has no right to 
present evidence that is irrelevant to an element of a crime or a 
legal defense. m He described the "right" to explain oneself to 
the jury as the right to jury nullification.22Ci Further, he de-
scribed jury nullification as an "illegitimate" and "fundamen-
tally lawless" act.226 Judge Trott asserted that "[i]f society 
deems important certain 'explanations,' those explanations ex-
plicitly can become part of the law. But until then, we should 
not allow litigants to slip through the back door when the front 
door is locked. "227 
C. THE CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT228 
Judge Noonan agreed that thirteen of Zal's contempt cita-
tions should be upheld, but he disagreed with the majority as to 
the remaining seven citations.229 Additionally, Judge Noonan 
agreed with Judge Trott that Zal's First Amendment rights 
should be measured by his clients' trial rights.230 Further, he 
agreed that jury nullification was not a right, but expressed that 
Zal did have a right to explain his clients' actions.231 Finally, 
Judge Noonan expressed that, under Berry, Zal had not acted 
unprofessionally in defying the trial court's in limine orders.232 
1. Separating the Contempt Citations 
Before addressing constitutional issues, Judge Noonan dis-
agreed with the majority's view that Zal's questions presented 
the excluded defenses.233 In Judge Noonan's opinion, Zal only 
violated the word-ban.234 Thus, he stated that since Zal only ac-
223. [d. at 930. 
224. [d. 
225. [d. See supra note 202 for a definition of jury nullification. 
226. Zal, 968 F.2d at 930. 
227. [d. 
228. Judge Noonan concurred in the result in part and dissented in part. 
229. Zal, 968 F.2d at 933. 
230. [d. at 935. 
231. [d. at 933. 
232. [d. at 936. 
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tually used banned words thirteen times, the other citations 
should be reversed.2311 If the trial court chose to form its in 
limine motion in terms of specific words, Judge Noonan noted, 
it should not be able to punish by analogy.238 
2. First Amendment Issues 
Judge Noonan's dissent neither measured nor determined 
an attorney's own First Amendment rights, but concluded that 
when Zal used the banned words, he was acting on behalf of his 
clients.237 Therefore, Judge Noonan believed ZaI's First Amend-
ment rights in this case should be measured by his client's 
rights.238 
Citing In re Little239 and Eaton u. City of Tulsa,240 Judge 
Noonan stated that vehement and even obscene language in the 
courtroom was traditionally protected by the First Amend-
ment.241 The test used in those cases to determine whether 
speech was constitutionally protected in the courtroom was the 
"imminent threat to the administration of justice" test.242 Judge 
Noonan observed that the test had upheld the constitutionality 
of vehement words unconnected to the substance of a litigant's 
case. He reasoned that it followed that language like ZaI's which 
was connected to the case being tried would also be protected by 
the First Amendment.243 
However, Judge Noonan conceded, the Gentile dicta which 
"circumscribed" attorney speech was likely a standard the 
United States Supreme Court would use today.24. Thus, Judge 
Noonan agreed that the in limine order did not violate ZaI's 
First Amendment rights because "[i]t was within the discretion 
of the court to prevent what it thought to be unnecessary recur-
235. [d. 
236. [d. 
237. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935. 
238. [d. 
239. 404 U.S. 553 (1972). See supra note 219 for a discussion of Little. 
240. 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974) (reversing a defendant's contempt citation for use of 
the phrase "chicken shit" during cross examination). 
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rence to this [abortion] theme."241! 
3. . Zal's Other Claims 
Judge Noonan agreed with Judge Trott that jury nullifica-
tion was not a right.24e However, he observed that Zal did have a 
right to explain his clients' actions.247 The right to explain is es-
sential to separating humans from subhumans even if such ex-
planation does not present a legally recognized defense.24s But, 
Zal's clients were given one chance to explain.249 So Judge Noo-
nan conceded that Zal had to yield to the trial court judge's 
order.2lio 
4. The Berry Rule 
Judge Noonan argued that Zal had the right to violate the 
in limine order and challenge the contempt citations.21i1 In re 
Berry21i2 states that, under California law, a contempt citation is 
void if it is based on an unconstitutional court order.21!3 Further, 
under California procedure, if an attorney is willing to take the 
risk, he can ignore the void order and be vindicated. 2M Thus, the 
holdings of Sacher and Gentile that an attorney's only right is 
to preserve an issue for appeal do not contemplate a system like 
that in California under Berry.21i1i Additionally, Judge Noonan 
stated that Zal had reason to challenge the in limine orders as 
245. Zal, 968 F.2d at 936. 
246. Id. at 933. 
247. Id. at 934. Judge Noonan explained: 
248. Id. 
As counsel for those accused of a crime, Zal had an obligation 
to them to present their defense and to present it not half-
heartedly, not mechanically, but zealously .... Zal, accord-
ingly, had the right to bring out the reason for his clients' ac-
tions. Even if the reason ... did not constitute a good defense 
under applicable law, an explanation allowed the jury to see 
his clients not as monsters mindlessly invading the rights of 
other[sj, but as human beings. 
249. Zal, 968 F.2d at 934. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 935. 
252. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). 
253. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935 (citing Berry, 436 P.2d at 280). 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 935. 
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overbroad.2116 Under California law, Judge Noonan declared that 
Zal did not act unprofessionally in resisting the in limine or-
ders.2&? While Zal had a right to disobey those orders, Judge 
Noonan conceded that Zal's constitutional challenges had 
failed. 2118 
v. CRITIQUE 
Zal's case raised the issue of whether, in an action for crimi-
nal trespass at an abortion clinic, an in limine ban of specific 
words relating to, inter alia, abortion, was constitutionaPll9 
While the Ninth Circuit held that the ban passed constitutional 
muster, it failed to perform a thorough substantive analysis of 
the ban itself.260 The court justified its limited analysis by rely-
ing on Sacher procedural guidelines that are inapplicable in Cal-
ifornia under Berry, and Gentile substantive guidelines which 
are necessarily incomplete.261 
By sanctioning the use of in limine word-bans without pro-
viding guidelines for analyzing them, the court has opened the 
door for unfettered judicial discretion.262 Under Zal, there is no 
need for judges to determine that banned words would be preju-
dicial or irrelevant in all possible contexts. In fact, under Zal, 
judges are not required to provide any reason for excluding cer-
tain words. Zal thus effectively gives a trial judge complete dis-
cretion to censor attorney speech in the courtroom. 
Undoubtedly, judges may need to exclude certain evidence 
from trials to preserve both the rights of the parties and court-
room decorum.268 However, since words are the tools of a trial . 
attorney, unfettered censorship could prevent an attorney from 
zealously advocating his client's case as well as encroach on an 
attorney's own First Amendment rights. Zal has given trial 
court judges a new and virtually unlimited power. Without 
256. [d. at 936. 
257. [d. 
258. [d. 
259. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582 
(1992). 
260. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29. 
261. See infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text. 
262. See infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text. 
263. See infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
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guidelines for the use of this power, judicial discretion may be-
come judicial abuse. 
A. IN RE BERRY - THE CALIFORNIA LAW? 
Zal claimed that the in limine word-ban violated his First 
Amendment free speech rights.264 He filed a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the constitutionality of the trial court's m 
limine word -ban. 2611 Zal had a right to do so under Berry. 266 
Berry provides for a substantive constitutional analysis of a 
court order after the order has been violated.267 If the order is 
unconstitutional, the contemnor's disobedience of that order will 
be excused.268 Thus, it is the underlying order, not the contem-
nor's defiance of the order, which must be analyzed.269 
The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to provide an in-depth 
First Amendment analysis of the trial court's evidentiary or-
ders.27o Instead, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Zal's reaction to the 
orders, specifically, his behavior in court.271 The Ninth Circuit, 
by relying on Sacher and Gentile, simply stated that Zal would 
not be protected by the First Amendment 'if he disobeyed the 
orders.272 By using Sacher and Gentile in this manner, the court 
effectively imposed the kind of "collateral bar" Berry forbids. 273 
The court used Berry inconsistently in its opinion. It spe-
cifically cites Berry to exercise jurisdiction over Zal's claims.274 It 
directly quotes language stating that a person may disobey a 
court order and then challenge that order at the contempt pro-
264. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925. 
265. [d. 
266. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 279. 
267. [d. 
268. [d. at 281. 
269. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 282. 
270. S'ee Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29. 
271. [d. 
272. [d. at 929 (UZealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the 
First Amendment."). 
273. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 282. 
274. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927 (U[Allthough a state may adopt the collateral bar rule, it 
need not do so as a matter of federal law. Since California has explicitly elected not to do 
so, see Berry, ... we can address the merits of Zal's First Amendment claim."). 
31
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ceedings.2711 However; in ruling on Zal's First Amendment claim, 
the court ignored the Berry rule. Instead, it cited Sacher (a fed-
eral case) to hold that Zal's only right was to respectfully pre-
serve his point for appeal. 276 This holding is wholly inconsistent 
with California law under Berry.277 In fact, reconciling these two 
rules would seem to be impossible. 
B. INAPPLICABILITY OF SACHER 
The court relied on Sacher for the proposition that an at-
torney may not resist a court order but may only "respectfully 
... preserve his point for appeal."278 Close analysis of Sacher 
reveals that the challenge the attorney made in Sacher was 
purely procedural: whether contempt citations could be issued 
summarily.279 Zal's challenge, however, is a purely substantive 
one.280 As the portion of Sacher the Ninth Circuit relied upon 
does not address substantive constitutional law, and its proce-
dural analysis does not apply to attorneys who defy court orders 
in California under Berry, it is inapplicable to Zal's challenge. 
C. GENTILE HAS LIMITED ApPLICABILITY 
Gentile reiterated Sacher's inapplicable procedural rule 
that a court ruling could not be resisted beyond the point neces-
sary to preserve a claim for appeal.281 Additionally, Gentile de-
termined that an attorney could be regulated under a less de-
manding standard than the clear and present danger test.282 
Finally, Gentile dicta stated that an attorney's free speech rights 
275. [do 
276. [do at 928. 
277. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 281 ("[A] person, under California law, may disobey the 
order and raise his jurisdictional contentions when he is sought to be punished for such 
disobedience.") . 
278. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (quoting Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9). 
279. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 5-7 ("[T]he importance of clarifying the permissible prac-
tice [of how contempt citations can properly be issued] in such cases persuaded us to 
grant certiorari, limited to one question of procedure on which there was disagreement in 
the court below."). 
. 280. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925 (Zal did not challenge any of the procedural methods used 
by the trial court). 0 
281. [do at 928. 
282. [do 
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in the courtroom were extremely circumscribed.283 
The Ninth Circuit's application of Gentile seems to lead to 
the conclusion that attorneys are without constitutional rights in 
the courtroom. However, Gentile, in fact, rejected arguments 
that attorneys lacked constitutional rights as participants in the 
judiciary process.284 Substantively, Gentile warned against blan-
ket rules restricting attorneys' First Amendment rights. 2811 Addi-
tionally, Gentile counseled that any rules restricting those rights 
warrant careful analysis.286 Specifically, Gentile held only that 
the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard prop-
erly balanced government interests and attorneys' First Amend-
ment rights.287 
Although Gentile dicta states that attorneys' courtroom 
rights are circumscribed, its holding and rationale lead to the 
conclusion that attorneys are afforded some (albeit limited) First 
Amendment protection in the courtroom. 
D. WHAT REMAINS AFTER SACHER AND GENTILE ARE OFFSET BY 
BERRY 
Sacher and Berry are polar opposites and cannot exist in 
the same jurisdiction. Berry is the California rule and should 
apply to all California cases.288 
After Sacher is eliminated from Gentile, Gentile can be rec-
onciled with Berry. Berry requires a substantive analysis and 
Gentile allows that analysis to be performed utilizing "less de-
manding" or even "extremely circumscribed" constitutional 
standards. Since both Berry and Gentile provide for some sub-
stantive analysis, the court had a duty to perform this analysis. 
As Gentile did not specifically provide a substantive test to 
283. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743. 
284. [d. at 2726. 
285. [d. at 2735. 
286. [d. at 2726 ("[IJn cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court 
has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to 
make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of 
free expression.' "). 
287. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. 
288. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 281-82. 
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balance attorneys' free speech rights in the courtroom against 
competing interests, the court had two options. It could have 
adopted a test that regulated attorneys' speech in a different 
context, such as Gentile's "less demanding" "substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice" test.289 Alternatively, it could have 
opted to devise its own balancing test.290 Regardless of which 
standard it selected, the court needed to apply the substantive 
standard to the in limine orders themselves (not the defiance of 
those orders). 
Instead, the Zal court failed to perform even a minimal sub-
stantive analysis. By failing to adequately analyze the in ·limine 
orders, the Ninth Circuit has effectively imposed an impermissi-
ble collateral bar on Zal's First Amendment claim. Furthermore, 
by failing to analyze the word-ban, the Ninth Circuit has effec-
tively sanctioned future bans without providing guidelines for 
their use. 
E. THE IN LIMINE WORD-BAN 
In Zal, the Ninth Circuit focused on the need to preserve 
courtroom decorum in order to protect parties' trial rights. 291 Al-
though the need to preserve courtroom decorum is undoubtedly 
important,292 the Ninth Circuit's decision is problematic for two 
reasons: (1) it failed to provide guidelines for granting or deny-
289. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. 
290. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for some traditional factors consid-
ered in a balancing test. 
291. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 ("The only question before us is who controls the trial. 
Under our current system, the trial judge is charged with preserving the decorum that 
permits a reasoned resolution of issues. Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority be-
hind the shield of the First Amendment. We hold nothing more.") (emphasis original). 
292. See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8 ("[Sjtrife can pervert ... the judicial process unless 
it is supervised and controlled by a neutral judge representing the overriding social inter-
est in impartial justice with power to curb both adversaries."); United States v. Young, 
470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("We emphasize that the trial judge has the responsibility to main-
tain decorum in keeping with the nature of the proceeding; the judge is not a mere mod-
erator, but is the governor of the trial for assuring its proper conduct."); Scott v. Ander-
son, 405 So.2d 228, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[Cjourts have continuously had the 
authority and power to maintain order in their courtrooms and to assure litigants of a 
fair trial."); People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1990) ("[Tjhere is clearly 
an inherent discretionary power in our courts to preserve order and decorum in our 
courtrooms and in the pursuance of such power, to protect the rights of all parties and 
witnesses and generally to further the administration of justice .... "). 
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ing word-bans;293 and (2) it failed to perform a thorough consti-
tutional analysis of such bans.294 Because the Ninth Circuit 
failed to express any sensitivity to the these issues, the decision 
in Zal is troubling. 
1. The Potential for Abuse of Judicial Discretion 
Trial court judges are given great discretion to determine 
whether evidence should be excluded from trial. 2911 This discre-
tion, however, is not unlimited.296 Commentators emphasize that 
the potential for abuse of discretion when excluding "irrele-
vant"297 or "prejudicial"298 evidence is particularly high.299 When 
293. The Zal court stated "the record does not contain the trial court's orders, 
which apparently were made orally .... " Zal, 968 F.2d at 925. Since the court approved 
the trial court's orders without any showing of findings that the banned words were prej-
udicial or irrelevant, it has implied that another court may do the same. 
294. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29. 
295. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 982 (1973); Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1990); Malave-Felix 
v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1991). 
296. Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 1523 (1992) ("[T)he discre-
tion to admit or exclude evidence is not unlimited. The discretion of a trial judge is not a 
whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion which is subject to the limitations 
of legal principles . . . ."). 
297. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (Deering 1986) describes relevant evidence as "evidence, 
including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having 
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action." Id. 
298. Arguably, CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1986) governs both prejudicial and 
irrelevant evidence. It provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." Id. Although the trial court 
judge in Zal exercised his inherent power to issue orders in limine, the record suggests 
that his decision was based on California Evidence Code sections 210 and 352. See supra 
note 21 (the prosecutor asked that words be excluded in accordance with sections 210 
and 352). 
299. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evi-
dence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 61 (1984) ("Rule 403's grant of discretion has been 
taken by the courts as license for an unprincipled, ad hoc approach to each case. Most 
courts are content to conclude evidence has probative value or is unfairly prejudicial 
without considering the meaning of those terms.") (Rule 403 is the federal equivalent to 
CAL. PENAL CODE §352). One early state case discussed the problems inherent in judicial 
discretion: 
When the chancellor is bidden to exercise his discretion . . . 
how is he to judge? Is he to make a law? Is he to formulate a 
rule governing such cases? Then he becomes the legislature 
. . . . And is one chancellor to make one rule and another 
chancellor a different rule? Then we live under a government 
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such discretion is not balanced against a duty to explain why the 
judge acted as he or she did, a judge may fail to carefully con-
sider the factors of each case,300 and may grant orders arbitrar-
ily, aimlessly or reflexively.301 One commentator has explained 
the situation of unbridled discretion as follows: 
Unbridled discretion leads to unpredictability, in-
equality of treatment and the elevation of indi-
vidual whim over principles validated by experi-
ence as well as by the popular will. The need to 
limit discretion in the application of laws of evi-
dence is particularly great. Leaving the resolution 
of those issues to unrestrained discretion does not 
simplify the law; it merely shrouds the law in a 
cloud of arbitrariness. 802 
Another commentator further argues that abuse of judicial dis-
cretion is rarely vindicated by appellate courts: 
Some of the most conspicuous abuses of . . . dis-
cretion are to be found in appellate opinions. Too 
often these opinions treat [the rule] as a grant of 
unfettered discretion to the trial judge ... rather 
than a rule requiring a careful balancing of fac-
tors so as to check discretion.808 
The possibility for abuse of discretion increases where word-
bans are concerned. Judges are generally experienced in deter-
mining how physical or testamentary evidence can be used. 
Thus, a judge can easily anticipate whether such evidence will 
be irrelevant or prejudicial. 
In contrast, mere words, taken out of context, have not tra-
of men, not laws .... 
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 58 A. 969, 970 (Vt. 1904). 
300. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature 
of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 54 WASH. L. REV. 497, 500·01 (1983) ("[M)ost cases 
utterly fail to conduct the required balancing test, or purporting to balance, give no hint 
as to how or why a particular balance was struck. The appellate courts commonly excuse 
these lapses on the grounds that Rule 403 grants courts discretion .... "). 
301. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, 
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). A partial goal of the Rosenberg 
article was to "help judges approach the problem of discretion reflectively and ... fully 
in order to avoid using its power reflexively and aimlessly." [d. at 636. 
302. Gold, supra note 300, at 500. 
303. David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 
1155, 1163 (1992). 
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ditionally been viewed as "evidence."304 In most cases, a judge 
would have difficulty anticipating how a specific word would be 
used. For example, in Zal's case, it is unlikely that the trial 
court judge considered all possible uses of the fifty excluded 
words and phrases. Accordingly, it would be difficult to deter-
mine whether a word was "prejudicial" or "irrelevant" unless 
the word was per se inflammatory, or lacked any legitimate use. 
For example, some of the· phrases excluded in Zal, such as 
"abortion," "fetus," and "unborn," were not per se inflam-
matory, and were clearly relevant to Zal's case.3011 Thus, taken 
together, the lack of guidelines governing word-bans and the dif-
ficulty of predicting how words will be used has increased poten-
tial for the abuse of judicial discretion. 
2. How Potential Abuse in Granting In Limine Word-Bans 
Could Conflict with Constitutional Rights 
In a situation where a judge is exercising discretion with re-
spect to an attorney's speech, an abuse of this discretion could 
potentially abridge an attorney's First Amendment rights. Be-
cause this threat exists, a more exacting analysis than the Ninth 
Circuit provided to analyze in limine word-bans should be 
required.306 
Regardless of whether or not an in limine word-ban is tech-
nically a prior restraint, it is an order that restricts words before 
they are spoken.307 Accordingly, it is analogous to a. prior re-
straint and thus requires close scrutiny to insure that it does not 
improperly intrude on First Amendment rights.308 
304. In fact, CAL. EVID. CODE § 140 (Deering 1986) describes evidence as "testimony, 
writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to 
prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact." 
305. The trial court judge himself questioned potential jurors about their feelings on 
abortion. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. This leads to the conclusion 
that the judge thought that abortion was a relevant subject. 
306. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ("As cases decided by this 
court have abundantly demonstrated, the line between speech unconditionally guaran-
teed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely 
drawn. The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive 
tools than California has supplied.") (citations omitted). 
307. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying. text for a definition and discussion 
of prior restraints. 
308. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In discussing an order that 
prohibited an attorney and his clients from disclosing information obtained through dis-
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The Ninth Circuit's failure to provide guidelines governing 
the proper use of in limine word-bans effectively permits trial 
court judges to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.80e Cen-
sorship is one of the areas that First Amendment doctrine most 
clearly prohibits,810 and censoring specific words an attorney 
may use in the courtroom is particularly dangerous. Specifically, 
censorship in the courtroom may impair an attorney's ability to 
zealously represent his or her client.8ll An in limine word-ban 
may thus run afoul of a client's Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel in addition to resulting in the suppres-
sion of an attorney's own First Amendment rights. 
ZaPs own use of the words banned by the trial court judge 
probably did not impair his clients' right to effective assistance 
.of counsel. 812 Some of the banned words were arguably per se 
covery, the Halkin court determined that the "fact that 'the order poses many of the 
dangers of a prior restraint is sufficient to require close scrutiny of its impact on pro-
tected First Amendment expression." [d. at 186. See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §4.04 (1984) (suggesting that one of the most important grounds 
for distinguishing prior restraints from subsequent punishment is the difficulty of know-
ing in advance what a given individual will say, thus running the risk that constitution-
ally protected speech will be forbidden). 
309. See Halkin. 598 F.2d at 185 n.18 ("A judicial order restraining speech casts the 
judge in a role comparable to that of a censor."). Although most censorship cases involve 
the censorship of obscenity, at least one commentator has noted that censorship is not 
limited to that context. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1970) ("Nothing in the rationale of Freedman and its predeces-
sors suggests that their principles are confined to the obscenity area."). Additionally, one 
United States Supreme Court case has noted that judges themselves can censor in an 
unconstitutional manner. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980) 
("That a state trial judge might be thought more likely than an administrative censor to 
determine accurately that a work is obscene does not change the unconstitutional char-
acter of the restraint if erroneously entered."). Further, another United States Supreme 
Court case has suggested that the fact that a censor has control over the forum is addi-
tionally dangerous. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) 
("[Tlhe danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment free-
doms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use."). 
310. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (suggesting that censorship 
is "fraught with danger and viewed with suspicion"). 
311. See Gallagher v. Municipal Ct., 192 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1948) ("Attorneys must 
be given substantial freedom of expression in representing their clients .... An advocate 
ought to be allowed freedom and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his clients 
case."); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1973) ("A court cannot deprive attor-
neys of their liberty or property in order to avert perceived threats to the administration 
of justice if the court's action would unduly impair legitimate, nondisruptive advocacy."). 
312. As one federal case counsels, "an attorney is not free to say literally anything 
and everything imaginable in a courtroom under the pretext of protecting his client's 
rights to a fair trial and fair representation." United States v. Cooper, 872 F.2d 1, 3 (1st 
Cir. 1989). 
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prejudicial.313 For example, baby killing, murder, assassin are 
particularly grapb.ic. Additionally, Zal used innocuous banned 
words in a potentially inflammatory manner when he asked wit-
nesses if they knew that babies were saved from abortions on 
the day of the trespass, and whether a witness was an unborn 
baby himself at some time.314 Accordingly, the judge in Zal 
could have held Zal in contempt for disorderly conduct.311l In-
stead, Zal was cited for violating the in limine word-ban.316 
While the result (contempt) is the same in both cases, the fact 
that the in limine ban was the reason Zal was cited sets a dan-
gerous precedent.· The holding in Zal permits a judge to censor 
potentially innocuous words. 
For example, it is possible that Zal could have used banned 
words in a manner that was neither irrelevant nor prejudicial. 
Additionally, words used in this manner might be necessary to 
effectively argue his clients' case. The word abortion provides 
the best example. The judge himself inferred that the word was 
relevant when he asked potential jurors if their feelings on that 
subject would prevent them from being impartial. 317 To put tes~ 
timony into context, Zal could have asked a witness whether she 
knew where the abortion clinic was, or why she was at the abor-
tion clinic. Surely, these questions would not be prejudicial. 
Although the power of the trial court judge to exercise dis-
cretion to "control" the courtroom serves important interests, 
judges must be wary of exercising this discretion at the expense 
of constitutional rights.318 The Ninth Circuit did not express any 
313. See supra note 21 for the full list of banned words. 
314. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. See supra note 25 for a list of the questions Zal asked 
which contained banned words. 
315. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (a) (Deering 1986) provides, in pertinent part, that a 
person may be held in criminal contempt for engaging in courtroom behavior that is 
"[d)isorderly, contemptuous, or insolent ... directly tending to interrupt its proceedings 
or to impair the respect due to its authority." 
316. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925 ("Zal ... challengers) his state court contempt citations for 
violating the trial court's evidentiary orders."). See supra note 29 for relevant text from 
the contempt citation. . 
317. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
318. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 913 (1977) ("[E)ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose 
means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty."). A reasonable bal-
ance between the need for judicial control and an attorney's first amendment rights has 
been counseled by two New York state courts as follows: 
[W)hile it is the duty of a judge to preserve order and to in-
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sensitivity to the possibility of abuse of judicial discretion. It 
failed to provide substantive guidelines to assist trial court 
judges in deciding whether to grant in limine word-bans, and 
thus effectively sanctioned unlimited discretion to censor attor-
ney speech in the courtroom. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Zal v. Steppe,319 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that a defense attorney who violated an 
in limine ban of specific words related to abortion could not 
seek refuge in his First Amendment free speech rights.320 By 
concluding that the attorney was not protected by the First 
Amendment in this circumstance, the Ninth Circuit was able to 
avoid performing a· thorough analysis of the constitutionality of 
the in limine word-ban itself. Consequently, the court has sanc-
tioned word-bans without providing guidelines for when and 
how they should be granted. By leaving trial court judges with 
unfettered discretion to grant word-bans, Zal has effectively 
given them a license to censor attorneys' speech in the 
courtroom. 
Kathleen K. McGinn* 
sure that justice is not obstructed, it nevertheless follows that 
any order or regulation imposed upon attorneys practicing 
before him, must be based upon factual conditions which leave 
no doubt that a continuance of the proscribed conduct will re-
sult in a disrespect for order and an impairment in the admin-
istration of justice. To this end, therefore, any such order or 
rule must have a reasonable or plausible basis, else this discre-
tionary power is subject to being declared arbitrarily 
exercised. 
Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting In re Peck v. 
Stone, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (App. Div. 1969». 
319. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992),cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582 
(1992). 
320. Id. at 929. 
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